Computing Optimal Commitments to Strategies and Outcome-conditional Utility Transfers
May 2024AAMASPaper
Abstract
Prior work has studied the computational complexity of computing optimal strategies to commit to in Stackelberg or leadership games, where a leader commits to a strategy which is observed by one or more followers. We extend this setting to one where the leader can additionally commit to outcome-conditional utility transfers. We characterize the computational complexity of finding optimal strategies in normal-form and Bayesian games, giving a mix of efficient algorithms and NP-hardness results. Finally, we allow the leader to also commit to a signaling scheme which induces a correlated equilibrium. In this setting, optimal commitments can be found in polynomial time for arbitrarily many players.
Cite this
@article{sauerberg2024computing,
title = {Computing Optimal Commitments to Strategies and Outcome-conditional Utility Transfers},
author = {Nathaniel Sauerberg and Caspar Oesterheld},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.06626},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-02-09},
urldate = {2024-02-09},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}